In the past 24 hours, Ukraine has gained control over western Kupyansk and the river crossing at Borovoya.
As expected, this made the Izyum garrison no longer tenable, with the Russians retreating beyond the Oskol River.
Observations 🧵
As expected, this made the Izyum garrison no longer tenable, with the Russians retreating beyond the Oskol River.
https://twitter.com/powerfultakes/status/1568332307387252738
Observations 🧵
No cope. This is unambiguously a major operational level defeat for Russia, and fulfills one of the two conditions (other being Kherson) I outlined that would make me tilt towards turning bearish on Russia's prospects in this war:
https://twitter.com/powerfultakes/status/1568332310579417089
In immediate terms, this pushes back the liberation of western Donbass, let alone Kharkov, into the indefinite future. This is just assuming the Ukrs have run out of steam & the new line stabilizes along the Oskol, worst case it gets pushed to LNR's borders.
But arguably the even more "blackpilled" implication here is that my long-standing core assumption for being a Russia bull - namely, that loss ratios sare tacked in its favor & bleeding out the Ukrainians is a viable long-term strategy - gets reduced in confidence.
Though not invalidated. That is, I still think Ukrainian casualties are on average much higher than Russian ones across all fronts, and this ensures eventual Russian victory in an attritional war (as most wars with the marked exception of early WW2 are).
https://twitter.com/powerfultakes/status/1518020190977642498
However, the fact of strong and sustained Ukrainian breakthroughs - e.g., continuing on to the borders of the LNR in the next couple of weeks - would put that ultimately hypothetical (both sides engage in casualtymaxxing propaganda) thesis under strain.
It also confirms Russian infantry combat effectiveness is subpar to Ukrainians (under equal conditions, they lose to Ukrainians), and are vastly more casualty-averse. Ukrainians hold villages to the last man vs Russian arty, while Russians just don't engage under such conditions.
As such, wherever Ukraine amasses a theater manpower advantage (8k vs 4k around Kharkov), and manages to buildup fuel and munitions, the Russian front crumples. Something we have just seen play out and may yet see again.
(Incidentally, retreating under such ratios is unimpressive & just goes to show extent to which Russia chugs along only by dint of huge materiel preponderance. In a hypothetical world in which Ukraine equalized here, it would steamroll Russia out of everywhere north of Crimea.)
Solving this does not necessarily entail full mobilization, but number of troops does need to be doubled, as I said in April:
It will take a long time - years, potentially - to attrition usable Ukrainian manpower to breaking point.
https://twitter.com/powerfultakes/status/1516390836166045698
It will take a long time - years, potentially - to attrition usable Ukrainian manpower to breaking point.
https://twitter.com/powerfultakes/status/1515745812088856581
More broadly, does loss of Izyum constitute a turning point in the war?
My assessment is, no it doesn't. Now for the whitepills:
The Kharkov theater was by far the most optimized for a Ukrainian breakthrough.
My assessment is, no it doesn't. Now for the whitepills:
The Kharkov theater was by far the most optimized for a Ukrainian breakthrough.
https://twitter.com/powerfultakes/status/1567814414711103488
How Kharkov > other fronts for Ukraine:
* Most critical: Russian troop density lower than in Kherson, Zaporozhye, or Donbass
* Terrain: Hills, forests, gullies
* Kharkov a center for nationalist batallions, Azov, Kraken, which are highly motivated & have high combat power.
* Most critical: Russian troop density lower than in Kherson, Zaporozhye, or Donbass
* Terrain: Hills, forests, gullies
* Kharkov a center for nationalist batallions, Azov, Kraken, which are highly motivated & have high combat power.
* Russian troops in the south have done consistently better that the troops from the Western Military District that predominate around Kharkov; for whatever reason, maybe more Syria experience, maybe specifics of their commanders, they have greater combat effectiveness.
As such, the specific factors that enabled success around Kharkov do not apply as much to other fronts.
Costly attacks on the Kherson continue, but without much success.
And onset of winter favors Russia.
Costly attacks on the Kherson continue, but without much success.
And onset of winter favors Russia.
https://twitter.com/powerfultakes/status/1567206874495205377
I think it's way premature to speculate about defeat or color revolution scenarios. That said, given the rapidity of the collapse & what it implies about Russian combat power, I lowered my confidence in eventual Russian victory from 90% to 60-70%, the biggest such change to date.
Ultimately, much will banally depend on Putin & how serious he is about fighting this as a proper war as opposed to the half-committed "special military operation" that it is today.
https://twitter.com/powerfultakes/status/1510680046142464004
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
